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MARINE INSURANCE POLICY IS MARITIME CONTRACT TO BE 
INTERPRETED UNDER ADMIRALTY LAW 
Human failure does not constitute a derangement or breakdown, and, as used in 
maritime insurance contracts, the terms "derangement" and "breakdown" refer 
only to mechanical failure 
Commercial Union Ins. v. Sea Harvest Seafood Co. 
251 F.3d 1294 ( l Oth Cir. 2001) 
(Filed June I I , 200 I )  
Commercial Union issued a maritime cargo insurance policy to Sea Harvest, a 
harvester and distributor of seafood, for a shipment of frozen shrimp on July 30, 1996. 
This case concerns the refrigeration clause of the policy. The clause insured against 
the damage or spoilage of the shrimp by "derangement or breakdown of the 
refrigeration machinery . . . " 
Sea Land Service Inc. provided transport of the shrimp for Sea Harvest. Sea 
Harvest declared shipment on October 30, 1998. The parties contracted that Sea Land 
would maintain a temperature suitable for the preservation of the shrimp in transit 
from Bangkok, Thailand to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. After a successful crossing of 
the Pacific Ocean the shrimp were unloaded in California to be shipped by rail to 
Philadelphia on November 2, 1998. During the transcontinental journey the 
refrigeration unit was not properly provided electrical power due to a failure to attach 
a "gen-set" power device to the cargo container. Upon delivery on November 18, 
1998 an inspection of the goods by Sea Harvest found the shrimp to be unsuitable for 
human consumption and filed a claim for the loss with Commercial Union. 
Commercial Union enlisted Luard & Company to do an inspection, it concluded that 
the shrimp were without refrigeration for two and one half days. Independent 
laboratory analysis by Certified Laboratories and Michelson Laboratories found that 
spoilage had occurred and that the shrimp needed to be destroyed. 
Commercial Union denied Sea Harvest's claim for the shrimp under the 
policy. On January 8, 1999 Commercial Union commenced an action for declaratory 
judgment under the maritime insurance policy on the grounds that Sea Harvest did not 
establish that the shipment was in good condition when coverage attached as required 
by the policy, and that the policy did not cover the claim. Commercial Union moved 
for summary judgment in the action on August 27, 1999. The district court granted 
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the motion and held that the failure to attach a gen-set to a container did not constitute 
the "derangement" or "breakdown" of the refrigeration unit under admiralty law. The 
assertion that Sea Harvest needed to establish the condition of the shrimp prior to 
shipment under the policy was not reached by the court because it determined that the 
policy excluded the claim. 
Sea Harvest appealed on the grounds that the court erred in applying admiralty 
law to the interpretation of the insurance policy. Sea Harvest argued that the word 
"derangement" as used in the policy was ambiguous and that under Kansas law 
governing the construction of ambiguous contracts the loss of the shrimp would be 
covered. 
The 1oth Circuit reviewed de novo using the same legal standard used by the 
district court, citing Byers V. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271 (I oth Cir. 1998). 
Under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Primary issues to be analyzed under the standard are I) the choice of law and 
2) the meaning of "derangement or breakdown of refrigeration equipment." 
Sea Harvest wanted the issue settled under state law, Commercial Union under 
admiralty. The I Oth Circuit held that the contract was maritime in nature in spite of 
the fact that the damage occurred on land and that the rule of admiralty should 
therefore be followed. The court held that the land transport was incidental to the 
ocean carriage. The contract was not a mixed one because the bill of lading did not 
consider land transport, the premium was only based on the shipment from Bangkok 
to Los Angeles (even though they were aware of the final destination being 
Philadelphia), and the warehouse to warehouse clause was controlling rather that an 
explicit statement of land travel in the contract. 
Having settled the choice of law issue, the court found no federal statute 
controlling as to whether the failure to attach the gen-set was a derangement or 
breakdown. In the absence of a Federal Statute the court may craft a rule. Wilburn 
Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314, 75 S. Ct. 368, 99 L.Ed. 337 
( 1955). The court relied upon two 9th Circuit cases to provide the rule: Larsen v. Ins. 
Co.. of North America, 252 F. Supp. 458 (W.O. Wash) ("Larsen f'), affd. 362 F.2d 
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261 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Larsen IF'); Sum a Fruit Int '!. v. Albany Ins. Co., 122 F. 3d 34 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
Larsen II held "[i]n order to be deranged, machinery must have some 
functional disorder in its own operation as distinguished from a simple failure to 
operate at all or an operation at an improper or insufficient rate of production or 
operation, due solely to the manner in which human beings in charge of the same 
choose to operate it." 
In Suma the Ninth Circuit held that human failure held that human failure does 
not constihtte a derangement or breakdown and that as used in maritime insurance 
contracts the terms "derangement" and "breakdown" refer only to mechanical failure. 
The Tenth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit holdings as law and applied them 
to the case before it. In  so doing the court found that the policy exclusion applied and 
that coverage was precluded under the policy. The grant of summary judgment was 
affirmed. 
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